This paper provides a comparative-statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary the e¤ectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player's income. The data show that contributions increase monotonically in punishment e¤ectiveness. High e¤ectiveness leads to near complete cooperation and welfare improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation. In these cases, punishment opportunities reduce welfare. The results suggest that the experimenter's choice of the punishment e¤ectiveness is of great importance for the experimental outcome.
Introduction
Recently, experimental economists devoted a lot of attention to the impact punishment opportunities have on cooperation in public-good games. 1 Punishment is decentralized, as it is not carried out by a central authority, and costly, as individuals purchase and assign punishment "points"that reduce the recipient's income. The results show that the existence of punishment opportunities can improve the level of cooperation signi…cantly.
Despite the large number of experiments, little is known about the robustness of the punishment schemes and the requirements on them to lead to higher cooperation levels and welfare improvement. Carpenter (2007, p.536 ) emphasizes this point and concludes that "there has been very little comparative statics analysis" and that the existing literature resembles "a series of unconnected islands".
The aim of this paper is to provide such a comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good games. We study the e¤ectiveness of punishment, that is, the amount by which a punishment point reduces the recipient's income. In particular, we examine four di¤erent levels of punishment e¤ectiveness in addition to a standard public-good game without punishment opportunities.
The study of punishment e¤ectiveness seems important for three reasons. First, one main conclusion of the literature on decentralized enforcement of cooperation is that the existence of punishment opportunities can lead subjects to "very high or even full cooperation ... whereas the same subjects converge to full defection in the no-punishment condition" (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, p.993 ; emphasis in original). It is important to know, therefore, whether any degree of punishment e¤ectiveness can have this e¤ect or whether a speci…c minimum degree is required to sustain cooperation. Second, punishments are costly for both punishers and victims. The existence of punishment opportunities can lead to welfare improvements only if the bene…ts from higher cooperation outweigh the punishment costs. Therefore, even if a higher e¤ectiveness of punishment would imply better cooperation, it is not obvious whether high e¤ectiveness is better than low e¤ec- tiveness from a welfare perspective. Third, researchers tend to choose di¤erent degrees of punishment e¤ectiveness for their experiments. Therefore, it is useful to understand to what extend di¤erences in results can be explained by the utilization of di¤erent degrees of e¤ectiveness.
The Experiment
The experiment is based on a repeated linear public-good game with n players. In every period, each participant is given an endowment y. Players then decide simultaneously and without communication how much of the endowment to contribute to a public account, c i , where 0 c i y. The rest (y c i ) remains in the player's own account. In addition to the money that player i keeps, i receives a …xed percentage of the group's total contribution to the public account, , where 0 < < 1 < n . This implies that the earnings of player i in the same period are
In the treatments with punishment opportunities, a second stage is added. After participants decide how much to contribute to the public account, they are informed about how much the other individuals in their group contributed. They can then, if they wish, purchase punishment points to reduce the income of one or more other participants. Punishment is costly for the punisher as every point reduces his income by 1 ECU (experimental currency unit). Let p ij denote the number of punishment points that player i assigns to j (where i; j=1, ..., n; j 6 = i), and e the reduction that one punishment point causes to its recipient. Player i's earnings at the end of the period are accordingly
Notice that the experiment utilizes the linear punishment technology employed in several recent papers (Fehr and In all treatments, it is common knowledge that y=20, n=4 and =0.4. The treatment variable is e, the e¤ectiveness of punishment: We have e 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g and the treatments are labelled "1", "2", "3"and "4"respectively. As a control treatment, we use the publicgood game without punishment. We label this treatment "0".
All treatments last for T =10 periods, a fact known to subjects. In the treatments with punishment opportunities, each subject is given a one-o¤ lump-sum payment of 25 ECU to pay for any losses the participant might incur in the duration of the experiment.
For the experiment we use …xed (or "partners") matching, that is, the group composition is the same in all periods. The reason for choosing …xed rather than random matching, where the group composition changes in every period, is that previous public-good experiments with punishment opportunities have shown that participants use punishment more frequently when groups remain unchanged. Therefore, we expect the e¤ect of punishment on contribution rates to be more pronounced, as, for example, in the "partners" sessions of Fehr and Gächter (2000) , and di¤erences across di¤erent degrees of punishment e¤ec-tiveness clearer under …xed matching. 3 Information feedback is as follows. Once the participants have contributed in stage one, they are informed about their group's total contribution to the public account, the individual contributions of the group members, and their own earnings as in (1) . To prevent the formation of individual reputation, every player is randomly given a number between 1 and 4 at the beginning of each period to distinguish their actions from those of the others in that period. Such a mechanism ensures that, even though the group members remain the same, the participants cannot create a link between the actions of the other subjects across the periods. In the treatments where punishment is available, at the end of each period, participants are informed about the punishment points they received, the . The e¤ectiveness of the punishment points is convex in the target's income in these studies which makes this technology somewhat less attractive for comparative statics analysis. For a discussion of the non-linear punishment technology, see Casari (2005) . 3 One important contribution of the public-good experiments with punishment under "perfect-strangers" matching protocol is to show that costly punishments occur even though punishers will not meet punished participants again. See, for example, Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Egas and Riedl (2005) .
associated income reduction and their earnings as in (2) .
The experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory of Royal Holloway
College (University of London) and University College London in January and February
2005
. We ran a total of ten sessions with a total of 120 subjects (12 per session). For each treatment, we have six groups, giving us six statistically independent observations. None of the participants had participated previously in a public-good experiment. Sessions lasted approximately …fty minutes and the average payment was £ 11.10 or roughly $20.90.
The exchange rate between the experimental currency units and the British pound was 1 ECU = £ 0.04. The experiments were conducted using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
Hypotheses
In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, punishments and punishment e¤ectiveness do not matter. Under the standard assumption that individuals maximize their own monetary payo¤, punishments will not occur in the last period of the experiment. Given that punishments do not take place, players do not contribute to the public account in the last period as this would only reduce their earnings (see (1)). By backward induction, this is the prediction for all periods. As punishments do not occur, the e¤ectiveness of punishment has no e¤ect. Similarly, contributions are predicted to be zero in treatment "0". Therefore, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, predictions are the same across treatments.
In addition to the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the …nitely repeated game, there are imperfect Nash equilibria in which cooperation can occur and in which punishment and punishment e¤ectiveness may play a role. Ostrom et al. (1992) derive such imperfect Nash equilibria for a common pool game with punishment possibilities.
They propose a simple symmetric strategy which we modify here for our game. In every period except the …nal period, T; contribute c i = y and choose p ij = 0; j 6 = i: In the event of a deviation, play c i = 0 and punish all players with p ij = e p > 0; j 6 = i; for one period, and contributions. Intuitively, the higher e; the harsher the maximum threat of punishment. Hence, there may be parameter constellations where imperfect Nash equilibria with positive contributions exist for some b e but fail to exist for any e < b e: More speci…cally for our game, since the punishments points e p assigned after a deviation must not exceed the minimum stage one income (that is, e p(n 1) y), the harshness of punishments depends primarily on e: Therefore, for low e; the threat may not be su¢ ciently high to sustain cooperation in an imperfect Nash equilibrium.
Punishments and punishment e¤ectiveness may also have an e¤ect in the model of other-regarding preferences developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In their model, people receive utility from their individual material income as in the standard model but their utility might be reduced from inequitable distributions of income. Fehr and Schmidt (1999, section IV) discuss predictions for a public-good game with punishment opportunities and include predictions about the relation between the e¤ectiveness of punishment and contribution behavior. 4 In particular, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that, as e increases, the requirement for the existence of equilibria with positive contributions is relaxed. Provided this requirement is met, actually any level between zero contributions and contributions of the full endowment can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium. However, if the condition is not met, the only subgame perfect equilibrium remaining is the one described above with zero contributions. It follows that higher levels of punishment e¤ectiveness make more likely the existence of equilibria with positive contributions. 4 The Fehr and Schmidt (1999, section IV) analysis of public-good games with punishment is actually formulated in terms of the cost of punishment, not punishment e¤ectiveness. The cost of punishment is the amount of ECU that a player must pay to reduce one's income by 1 ECU-in our case 1=e: As pointed out by a referee, while cost of punishment and punishment e¤ectiveness are analytically equivalent, this may not be the case behaviorally.
Results
We start by reporting results on contributions to the public account, followed by a welfare comparison of the treatments, and a brief discussion of punishment behavior. Unless otherwise noted, the statistical tests below use each group as one observation. The group data are summarized in Table A1 in the appendix. Since we have more than two treatments, we report Kruskal-Wallis tests when we compare means. We proceed to pair-wise treatment comparisons using the Dwass-Steel-Critchlow-Fligner post-hoc procedure which corrects for multiple comparisons (see e.g. Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) only if the Kruskal-Wallis indicates signi…cant di¤erences in the means. Figure 1 presents the mean contributions in periods 6-10 across treatments. Figure 1 reveals that, as the e¤ectiveness of punishment increases, so does the mean contribution.
The relationship between e¤ectiveness and contributions is monotonic; we never …nd that higher e¤ectiveness leads to lower contributions. Average treatment contribution rates and treatment e¤ectiveness are positively correlated (Spearman correlation, two sided, p=0.01). The di¤erences in mean contributions across the treatments are also statistically signi…cant (Kruskal-Wallis, d:f:=4, p = 0:01). 5 We summarize
Result 1: Average contributions increase monotonically in the e¤ ectiveness of punishment.
Insert Figure 1 here
The evolution of average contributions over time is illustrated in Figure 2 . In period one, subjects contribute on average between 40% and 63% of their endowment, consistent 5 The Dwass-Steel-Critchlow-Fligner post-hoc procedure indicates that …ve out of ten pair-wise comparisons con…rm the monotonic relationship between e¤ectiveness and contributions and none contradicts it.
Treatments "2", "3" and "4" have signi…cantly higher contribution rates than "0" (all p=0.05, two-sided) and treatments "3"and "4"have signi…cantly higher contribution rates than "1"(p=0.1, two-sided). Note that this procedure is more conservative than the Mann-Whitney procedure which is often used for pairwise comparisons across subjects.
with previous public-good experiments with and without punishment. Period one contributions are not signi…cantly di¤erent across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis, d:f:=4, p=0:610).
From period two onwards, contributions decrease in treatments "0" and "1", are roughly constant in "2", whereas they increase in treatments "3" and "4". The time trends are signi…cant except for treatment "2" (Spearman correlation, two tailed, p < 0:05). 6 Remarkably, Result 1 (monotonicity) holds in every period except for the …rst.
Result 2: Average contributions decrease over time in "0" and "1", they are constant in "2", whereas they increase in "3" and "4".
Insert Figure 2 here
We now discuss the e¤ect of punishment e¤ectiveness on subjects' earnings. Higher contributions do not necessarily imply higher earnings in experiments with punishment.
The reason is that punishments are costly for both punishers and punished individuals.
The welfare loss due to punishments might o¤set the welfare gain from higher contributions. To see how the e¤ectiveness of punishment in ‡uences group welfare (which is equal to the sum of earnings), we calculate the cumulative relative earnings (CRE) between treatments with punishment and treatment "0". This is done using the following formula
where CRE t stands for cumulative relative earnings in treatment 2 f\1"; \2"; \3"; \4"g compared to treatment "0" up to period t, and P t s=1 s the average cumulative earnings up to period t of treatment :
The evolution of CRE over time can be seen in Figure 3 . In period one, the treatments with punishment opportunities have CRE < 0 as contribution rates are similar to those in "0" and individuals incur the punishment-associated costs. From period one onwards, CRE increases in all treatments. However, as Figure 3 illustrates, the increase in "1"is not su¢ cient to o¤set the losses that occurred in the …rst periods. In "2", higher contributions manage to o¤set the costs of punishment only in the last two periods. This holds true for treatment "3" from period six onwards. Finally, we see treatment "4" has the highest level of welfare as CRE > 0 already in period four. The di¤erence in total earnings across all ten periods, as observed in t=10 in Figure 3 , is statistically signi…cant (Kruskal-Wallis, d:f:=4, p=0:02). 7
Result 3: A punishment e¤ ectiveness of "3" or greater is required to obtain a welfare improvement compared to the public-good game without punishment (treatment "0"). The higher punishment e¤ ectiveness is the sooner the existence of punishment opportunities leads to a welfare improvement compared to treatment "0".
Insert Figure 3 here We also analyzed the determinants of punishment in detail, but we refrain from reproducing the regression results here as we, by and large, con…rm previous results (Ostrom et al., 1992; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007) . For a detailed discussion of the …ndings see Nikiforakis and Normann (2005) . In summary, we …nd a positive relationship between the e¤ectiveness of punishment and the punishment that i in ‡icts on j. Given that the cost of punishment is 1=e; this veri…es previous characterizations of punishment as an ordinary good. 8 Also in line with the existing literature, we …nd that the higher the income of i; the less punishment points i assigns. That is, punishment can be characterized as an inferior good (as de…ned in Varian, 1999 
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper shows that the selection of punishment e¤ectiveness (de…ned as the factor by which one punishment point reduces the punished player's income) plays a signi…cant role in determining the experimental outcome. Contributions to the public account increase monotonically in the e¤ectiveness of punishment as does welfare. A minimum level of punishment e¤ectiveness (three) is required to signi…cantly raise contributions over time.
Similarly, a punishment e¤ectiveness of two is required so that the bene…ts of higher contribution rates o¤set the costs of punishment. Note that we do not claim that these 8 One of our referees is sceptical about interpreting punishment as a good for the following reasons. On top of the question whether the cost of punishment can actually be viewed as a price, the referee correctly points out that the existence of a downward sloping demand curve at the aggregate level does not imply that the law of demand holds at the individual level. Moreover, the demand interpretation is based on the rational choice model, however, individuals are not always fully rational in these experiments. 9 Individual behavior resembles the strategy of the imperfect Nash equilibria in that punishments usually follow instances of low contributions. However, similar to Ostrom et al. (1992, p . 411), we also …nd inconsistencies with the imperfect Nash equilibria in that punishments were too severe and earnings too low in many cases. 
